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Hedge Funds: A New Dimension in Chapter 11
Bankruptcy Proceedings
Bo J. Howell*
I. INTRODUCTION
Hedge funds are becoming prominent players in bankruptcy pro-
ceedings. In fact, some experts have stated that hedge fund involve-
ment in Chapter 11 cases has become pervasive and extremely active.1
Opinions regarding their involvement in bankruptcy proceedings
range from critics who demonize the funds to proponents who see the
value in having a flexible, unrestrained creditor.2
The growing financial pressure on hedge funds is increasingly driv-
ing them into the bankruptcy realm. Hedge fund involvement in bank-
ruptcy is relatively new, but their presence brings a great deal of
liquidity and sophistication to bankruptcy cases.3 As active debt and
equity traders, hedge funds are increasingly turning to distressed in-
vestment, which brings them into direct contact with the bankruptcy
system.4
From a hedge fund's perspective, a distressed company is an invest-
ment that can create above-market returns.5 Hedge funds are increas-
ingly interacting with insolvent debtors to turn an investment into a
quick profit.6 In addition, the relatively high risks inherent in dis-
tressed debtors and bankruptcy proceedings are consistent with the
hedge fund industry in general, which seeks to manage high-risk, high-
reward investment.
* Law Clerk for Chief Justice Mark Gibbons, Nevada Supreme Court. Judicial Extern for the
Honorable Patricia C. Williams and the Honorable John A. Rossmeissl, U.S. Bankruptcy Court
for the Eastern District of Washington. J.D. 2008, Gonzaga University School of Law. B.A. 2005,
Washington State University.
1. Eric B. Fisher & Andrew L. Buck, Hedge Funds and the Changing Face of Corporate Bank-
ruptcy Practice, 25 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 24, 24 (2007).
2. Mark Berman & Jo Ann J. Brighton, Hedge Funds: Lessons Learned from the Radnor Deci-
sion, 26 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 30, 30 (2007).
3. Peter M. Gilhuly et al., Changing Roles in Commercial Cases: The Impact of Hedge Funds
on the Restructuring Landscape, SM084 ALI-ABA 449, 451-52 (2007).
4. Berman & Brighton, supra note 2, at 30.
5. Fisher & Buck, supra note 1, at 24.
6. Gilhuly, supra note 3, at 452.
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The result, according to The Economist, is a rise in Chapter 11
bankruptcies, particularly among low-rated American companies. 7
The growing presence of hedge funds in corporate finance affects
Chapter 11 bankruptcies in many ways, including an increased aver-
age number of creditors for a distressed company, a lack of familiarity
between creditors and debtors, and an expansion in the variety of loan
types, including "senior or first-lien creditors (who have first dibs on a
company's assets), second-lien creditors (who also have claims over
the assets of a company, but who get paid only after first-lien credi-
tors), mezzanine creditors, senior subordinated debt holders and
subordinate debt holders." 8 Since hedge funds interact with distressed
debtors at different points in time and in different creditor-debtor re-
lationships, bankruptcy proceedings are becoming more complex,
lengthier, and costly. 9
Often, strategic goals of hedge funds have a direct impact on Chap-
ter 11 bankruptcy proceedings. The presence of hedge funds in bank-
ruptcy proceedings is raising new legal issues, which implicate
government regulators, such as the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission, and the bankruptcy system. Hedge funds' aggressive at-
tempts to achieve relatively quick profits have raised issues regarding
ad hoc committee disclosure, equitable subordination, and debt
recharacterization.
For better or worse, it appears that hedge fund involvement in
bankruptcy proceedings is established. As a result, it is important to
understand how hedge funds approach Chapter 11 proceedings and
what issues arise after a hedge fund becomes involved. Part II
presents a structural and mechanical overview of hedge funds and
how they operate. Part III discusses the impact of hedge funds on
bankruptcy proceedings and the various issues that arise when a hedge
fund engages a distressed debtor or other creditors. Finally, Part IV
summarizes the costs and benefits of hedge fund involvement in
Chapter 11 proceedings.
II. AN OVERVIEW OF HEDGE FUNDS
Traditionally, public financial institutions raised capital through the
public market. Over the past fifteen years however, there has been a
"migration of capital from traditional financial institutions into private
7. The Walking Dead, ECONOMIST, Dec. 15, 2007.
8. Id.
9. Id.
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or quasi-private funds," including hedge funds.10 Hedge funds have
been described as "the mysterious rich uncle of the investment indus-
try family; no one agrees on his age, occupation or history, but every-
one knows that he is related."11 More precisely, hedge funds are pools
of capital that are "privately organized, professionally administered,
and not widely available to the public.' 12
A. Structural Overview
Like other investment vehicles, such as mutual funds, hedge funds
are theoretically basic: A specific and limited group of investors com-
bines their money and shares in the returns. 13 In addition, hedge funds
invest in some of the same assets as other investment vehicles. Despite
these basic theoretical similarities, however, the reality is that hedge
funds are significantly different from most investment vehicles. The
higher minimum buy-in, risky investment strategies, fee structures,
and non-public nature of hedge funds separate them from other indus-
try players.
Traditionally, hedge funds limited their availability to wealthy indi-
viduals or institutional investors, but more recently some funds re-
duced their minimum investment amounts or provided back-door
access through mutual funds.14 Regardless, hedge fund investors use
various business structures to take advantage of favorable tax treat-
ment and other regulatory loopholes.15 The most important loophole
is the SEC's registration exemption, although the Commodities Fu-
tures Trading Commission ("CFTC") also has registration exemp-
tions.16 In addition, hedge funds are extremely flexible because, unlike
regulated investment companies, hedge funds are free from diversifi-
cation requirements or other investment restrictions.17 The combina-
tion of regulatory freedom, the ability to leverage assets, and market
10. Cynthia Futter & Anne E. Wells, What to Expect From Hedge Funds Today and In the
Future: An Overview and Insolvency Perspective, 29 CAL. BANKR. J. 213, 214 (2007).
11. Joseph Hellrung, Hedge Fund Regulation: Investors Are Knocking at the Door, But Can
the SEC Clean House Before Everyone Rushes In?, 9 N.C. BANKING INST. 317, 319 (2005).
12. Sue Ann Mota, Hedge Funds: Their Advisers Do not Have to Register with the SEC, But
More Information and Other Alternatives are Recommended, 67 LA. L. REv. 55, 55 (2006) (citing
David A. Vaughn, Selected Definitions of "Hedge Fund" SEC ROUNDTABLE ON HEDGE FUNDS
(May 14-15, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/hedgefunds/hedge-vaughn.htm).
13. Gilhuly, supra note 3, at 452.
14. Thomas L. Hazen & Jerry W. Markham, Broker Dealer Operations Under Securities and
Commodites Law, Broker-Dealers-The Regulatory Era: Mutual fund scandals, 23 SECBDOP
§ 2:51 (2008).
15. Hellrung, supra note 11, at 320.
16. Id. at 321.
17. Jessica Natali, Trimming the Hedges is a Difficult Task: The SEC's Attempt to Regulate
Hedge Funds Falls Short of Expectations, 15 U. MIAMI Bus. L. REv. 113, 116 (2006).
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flexibility allow hedge funds to capitalize on risky investments and
maximize their returns.
Today, the term hedge fund is a "'catch-all classification for many
unregistered privately managed pools of capital." '18 As a result, four
securities statutes possibly regulate hedge fund activities, including:
(1) the Securities Act of 1933 ("Securities Act"); (2) the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934; (3) the Investment Advisors Act of 1940; and
(4) the Investment Company Act of 1940.19 These Acts have indirectly
shaped the evolution and structure of hedge funds because the funds
mold themselves into the available exemptions. 20
Hedge funds generally utilize Section 4(2) of the Securities Act-
the private placement exemption-which "exempts issuers who sell
securities only to 'accredited investors' without any form of 'general
solicitation or advertising."' 21 Under Section 4(2), hedge funds can
circumvent the SEC registration requirement by avoiding public offer-
ings and limiting availability to accredited investors. 22 SEC Regulation
D, which implements Section 4(2), contains four requirements for any
investor utilizing the registration exemption:
(1) the fund cannot utilize general solicitation or advertising in mar-
keting its securities; (2) the fund can only sell its securities to 'ac-
credited investors' and up to 35 other purchasers (who must possess
sufficient financial and business knowledge and experience in order
to evaluate the risks associated with the fund); (3) the fund advisor
must be available for questions from prospective purchasers; and
(4) the securities issued by the fund cannot be redeemed for at least
a year after purchase and cannot be resold.23
Currently, Regulation D also sets threshold limits for qualification
as an accredited investor. The threshold requirement for legal entities
is $5 million in assets.24 For individuals, the threshold is either a net
worth of $1 million or a gross annual income of $200,000 ($300,000 for
married couples).2 5 If a party does not meet the definition of an ac-
credited investor, Rules 506 and 502 of Regulation D require the is-
suer to "furnish the purchaser with non-financial information material
18. Id. (citing Joseph C. Long, A Hedge Fund Primer, Practicing Law Inst., Aug. 2005, at 233
(quoting SEC Chairman William H. Donaldson)).
19. Hellrung, supra note 11, at 323 (footnotes omitted).
20. Id.
21. Id. at 324 (quoting SEC, Implications of the Growth of Hedge Funds vii (Staff ed. 2003);
Natali, supra note 17, at 318).
22. Mota, supra note 12, at 59.
23. Natali, supra note 17, at 118 (citing SEC Staff Report, Implications of the Growth of
Hedge Funds (2003) and SEC, Rule 506 of Regulation D, 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (2005), available at
http://www.sec.gov/answers/rule506.htm).
24. SEC, Rule 501(a) of Regulation D, 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a) (2004).
25. Id.
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to an understanding of the business and of the securities being of-
fered, as well as any relevant financial statements and the information
contained therein. ' 26 The increased information requirements usually
result in hedge funds transacting only with accredited investors.27
B. Mechanical Overview
Hedge funds are usually limited liability companies, limited partner-
ships, or general partnerships. 28 A fund manager directs the funds and
levies a 2-5% management fee as well as a 20-40% performance fee.29
Hedge funds lock-up investors' capital for varying periods of time.30
Unlike traditional lenders, such as banks or mutual funds, hedge funds
have more flexibility in, and control over, their investments. "In order
to effectuate their goals, [hedge funds] almost always have a represen-
tative sit on the board or oversight body for the entity and usually
have captive management or professionals monitoring the progress
and implementing the strategy they want implemented in order to gar-
ner the returns they seek."' 31 Thus, hedge funds are closely involved
with their investments.
Hedge funds are modern day corporate raiders. "In order to insure
higher returns than traditional equity markets, the rallying cry of
hedge [f]unds ... has been their ability - and willingness - to pursue
aggressive and multiple investment strategies. ' 32 Hedge funds create
wealth by using short selling-the speculation that security prices will
drop-and other leverage strategies as well as direct investment in
operating companies or in the distressed markets. 33 To implement
quick return strategies, hedge funds pour large amounts of capital into
companies, which gives the funds a controlling stake and allows them
to force their agenda upon the company.34 In addition to using public
securities to assert control, an increasingly popular strategy involves
privatizing a public company through an equity buyout.35
Finally, second-lien and subprime loans are two additional strate-
gies that hedge funds have used to pursue rapid returns. 36 Second-lien
26. Natali, supra note 17, at 118 (citing SEC, Rule 502 of Regulation D, 17 C.F.R. § 230.502
(2005) and 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (2005)).
27. Id. at 119.
28. Futter & Wells, supra note 10, at 215.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 216.
31. Id. at 217.
32. Id.
33. Futter & Wells, supra note 10, at 217-18; Berman & Brighton, supra note 2, at 30.
34. See id. at 220 (discussing the example of hedge funds in the restaurant industry).
35. Id. at 221.
36. Id. at 221-22.
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loans are security interests in a borrower's collateral, but the interests
are subordinate to first-lien creditor's interests.37 Further, the loans
frequently involve extensive inter-creditor agreements, which attempt
to regulate creditors' rights in the event of bankruptcy. 38 Thus, a
hedge fund's extension of a second-lien loan to a distressed debtor
brings the fund into direct contact with the debtor, other creditors,
and the bankruptcy system. In addition, subprime loans, which are
high-priced loans to high-risk individuals, 39 are consistent with the
hedge fund industry's high-risk, high reward approach. But the higher
default rate in subprime loans progressively brings hedge funds in di-
rect contact with the bankruptcy system.
C. Hedge Fund Industry Growth
Hedge funds are increasingly popular because of their alleged abil-
ity to outperform the stock market and other investments. The rise of
securitization has made hedge funds increasingly popular because the
funds are able to spread investment risks through multiple investment
vehicles.40 Between 1985 and 2005, hedge funds and other alternative
investments expanded their share of the capital market from 16% to
50%.41 In 2005, the hedge fund industry boasted 8,000 funds with
combined assets over $1 trillion. 42 By 2006, the value of the hedge
fund industry was $1.5 trillion, although there was a 9.4% decrease in
the amount invested.43
As stated earlier, second-lien and subprime loans directly affect the
bankruptcy system because the loan-types bring hedge funds in direct
contact with distressed debtors, other creditors, and the bankruptcy
courts. The rise of second-lien and subprime lending has created new
financial markets, which hedge funds have dominated.4 "Until 2003,
second lien debt was not a major part of the financial landscape. The
current wave of second lien debt traces its origins to efforts to circum-
vent anti-layering covenants found in many high-yield public debt in-
dentures. ' 45 Since 2003, however, the second-lien market increased
37. Robert P. Bartlett III, Taking Finance Seriously: How Debt Financing Distorts Bidding
Outcomes in Corporate Takeovers, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1975, 2012 n.130 (2008).
38. Futter & Wells, supra note 10, at 222.
39. Michael C. Tomkies, Regulating the Subprime Market: Finding the Right Balance, 17-AUG
Bus. L. TODAY 21, 21-22 (2008).
40. Futter & Wells, supra note 10, at 214.
41. Id.
42. Natali, supra note 17, at 114.
43. Futter & Wells, supra note 10, at 214-15. The amount invested in 2005 was $139.6 billion as
opposed to the $126.5 billion in 2006. Id. at 215.
44. Id. at 221-22.
45. Gilhuly, supra note 3, at 461.
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from $3.076 billion to more than $16.298 billion.46 In 2005, second-lien
loans alone constituted a $15 billion market, a ten-fold growth from
2002. 47 From 2005 to 2006, more than $51.6 billion in new second-lien
loans originated. 48 Within the last fifteen years, the securitization of
subprime loans created a $1.3 trillion industry.49 Further, the recent
collapse of the subprime market has caused the interaction between
hedge funds and the bankruptcy system to exponentially expand.
III. HEDGE FUNDS' IMPACT ON BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDINGS
One area of hedge fund activity that has yet to receive much atten-
tion is bankruptcy, but hedge funds are quickly establishing their pres-
ence in many Chapter 11 cases. A growing number of hedge funds are
investing in distressed and bankrupt companies to achieve greater re-
turns.50 Hedge fund involvement in Chapter 11 cases-also known as
the corporate reorganization process-benefits distressed debtors
through increased financing and competitive financing terms.,' Al-
though hedge funds may provide some benefits to the corporate reor-
ganization process, their presence also raises a number of concerns,
including more complex, costly, and lengthy bankruptcy proceedings.
Hedge funds have already established their presence in many Chap-
ter 11 cases as first- or second-lien creditors, unsecured creditors,
debtor-in-possession (DIP) lenders, and equity holders.52 Further, a
fund's aggressive pursuit of profits often creates conflicts between
hedge funds and the distressed debtor or other creditors, who often
hold the "rehabilitationist" view that the purpose of reorganization is
to create a stronger, healthier corporate entity that benefits all inter-
ested parties.5 3
A. Pre-Petition Restructurings
One emerging bankruptcy trend is the pre-petition restructuring of
Chapter 11 debtors. The pre-packaging of bankruptcy petitions is a
result of creditors negotiating the restructure prior to filing in an at-
46. Id. at 451.
47. Futter & Wells, supra note 10, at 222 (quoting Don Durfee, Meet Your New Bankers:
Hedge funds have a pile of cash to lend. Should you take it?, CFO.coM (Feb. 1, 2006)).
48. Id. at 222.
49. Id.
50. Fisher & Buck, supra note 1, at 24.
51. Id.
52. Berman & Brighton, supra note 2, at 30.
53. Harvey R. Miller & Shai Y. Waisman, Is an Imperfect Chapter 11 the Best of All Alterna-
tives?, 15 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 1, Art. 2 (2006) (emphasis added).
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tempt to expedite the process. 54 Hedge funds prefer pre-packaged
deals because it allows them "more control over the final outcome and
... less risk of a fire sale of assets. ' 55 Hedge funds are willing to fund
the minimal operations of a Chapter 11 debtor to keep the entity mov-
ing towards a liquidity event (such as a sale or merger), so the hedge
fund does not get stuck at the back of the creditors' line in bankruptcy
proceedings.56 Accordingly, hedge funds are becoming actively in-
volved with distressed debtors prior to the filing of a bankruptcy
petition.
As a source of necessary capital, hedge funds are able to create an
influential relationship with the distressed debtor. In essence, the
funds are able to provide what most other creditors will not - capital.
Once the distressed debtor has filed for bankruptcy, a hedge fund will
use its position to structure and confirm a reorganization plan. The
ultimate goal is to quickly steer the distressed debtor through the
bankruptcy process in order to become a profit-making entity.
If a hedge fund becomes an equity-holder prior to the bankruptcy
filing, it can utilize Bankruptcy Code Section 1129(b) to cram the pre-
packaged plan onto objecting senior creditors.57 Thus, the fund can
avoid the priority rule by claiming its capital contribution as new value
under the new-value corollary, discussed below.
Unfortunately, pre-packaged plans are worthwhile only if they are
quickly implemented, which in turn requires creditors to agree on the
terms.58 The problem arises when a hedge fund sits towards the bot-
tom of the food chain. In that situation, the fund will often hold out
for better terms-particularly if they control the majority of a voting
class.59 Generally, all voting classes must approve submitted plans
prior to confirmation. Often, a hedge fund with a number of first- and
second-lien loans will use their position to block votes in an effort to
negotiate a higher pay-off position.60
In effect, hedge funds are able to strategically invest in distressed
companies to position themselves in the event the company restruc-
tures or files for bankruptcy. 61 The fact that the debt is easily transfer-
able complicates matters because debt holders are constantly turning
54. Walking Dead, supra note 7.
55. Id.
56. Futter & Wells, supra note 10, at 245.
57. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b) (2005).
58. Walking Dead, supra note 7.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
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over, even during pre-packaged bankruptcy negotiations.62 In the end,
conflicts between creditors often result in many creditors and the dis-
tressed debtor losing out.
B. New Value Corollary
A hedge fund that is an equity holder prior to bankruptcy may run
into some issues while attempting to retain its equity position in the
reorganized debtor. In some cases, the absolute priority rule bars in-
siders who invest in a distressed debtor from receiving equity holdings
in the reorganized debtor. Whenever a plan is proposed that will grant
the benefit of equity ownership to only old equity holders, the plan
must be treated as property within the meaning of Section
1129(b)(2)(B)(ii). 63 The absolute priority rule rejects such plans.64 In
other words, if old equity holders provide new capital in return for an
equity stake in the reorganized debtor, then the old equity holders
must list the anticipated equities as property.
However, a "new-value" corollary allows insiders to avoid the abso-
lute priority and confirm a Chapter 11 plan that allows for the reten-
tion of the insider's equity holdings. As a result, a hedge fund looking
to retain its equity holdings in a distressed debtor may do so by meet-
ing the requirements of the new-value corollary. The new-value re-
quirements are: (1) the old equity holder must provide a full-value
transaction in cash,65 which is subject to a market test,66 and (2) all
senior-class creditors, interested parties, and competitors must have a
full and fair opportunity to contribute new capital and receive owner-
ship interests in the reorganized debtor. 67
Although the United States Supreme Court has not recognized a
"new-value" corollary to the absolute priority rule under the current
Code, the Court's rulings on the issue imply that the rule has survived
the enactment of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code. All but the Eighth and
Eleventh Circuit Courts have held the corollary survived the 1978
Bankruptcy Code.68 As a result, old equity holders may provide new
value to the distressed debtor in return for equity holdings in the reor-
ganized entity, so long as the senior creditors have the opportunity to
do so first.69 In other words, the old equity holders cannot finance a
62. Id.
63. Gilhuly, supra note 3, at 454-55.
64. Id. at 458.
65. Id. at 454.
66. In re Union Fin. Servs. Group, Inc., 303 B.R. 390, 423 (E.D. Mo. 2003).
67. Id. at 426.
68. 5 BANKR. SRV. L. ED. § 45:449 (2007).
69. In re Bonner Mall Partnership, 2 F.3d 899, 907 (9th Cir. 1993).
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new claim to the reorganized entity unless every senior creditor first
refuses the opportunity.
Ultimately, a hedge fund that is also a pre-petition equity holder
may remain an equity holder in the reorganized debtor if it satisfies
the particular requirements for the new-value corollary. Through the
corollary, a hedge fund may be able to buy a position that allows it to
cram down a favorable reorganization plan. Given that many hedge
funds have the capital necessary to satisfy the new-value require-
ments, such a strategy may be particularly effective in achieving the
fund's goals.
C. Post-Petition Fund Behavior
Hedge funds tend to follow a number of similar post-petition pat-
terns. Following their investment strategies, hedge funds are likely to
continue to push for a liquidity event, which requires them to make a
play for ownership of the restructured business. 70
As hedge funds attempt to solidify their positions and buttress their
priority, the lack of documentation regarding the hedge fund and
debtor's rights and obligations will lead to increased adversary pro-
ceedings. 71 Because traditional creditors' remedies are not available to
hedge funds, the types of issues they raise are likely to be novel.72
Rather than fights over liquidation, foreclosure, adequate protec-
tion, valuation, exclusivity, conversion and then plan confirmation
fights, [hedge funds] typically ha[ve] sale or liquidation of the com-
pany (or conversion of a chapter case) as their only threat for a
dawdling borrower. Furthermore . . . [a]ctive participation in the
management and strategic direction of the company will raise more
questions of control liability, lender liability, re-characterization of
debt into equity, equitable subordination and other legal machina-
tions only rarely seen by creditors in traditional lending and insol-
vency situations.73
Ultimately, the flexible, high risk, and unregulated behavior of hedge
funds will bring a host of unique bankruptcy issues to the system's
doorstep. Securities and finance issues will become more common in
Chapter 11 cases and bankruptcy courts will need to expand their
knowledge and adapt to novel issues.
70. Futter & Wells, supra note 10, at 242-43.
71. Id. at 243.
72. Id.
73. Id.
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1. Section 363: Sales of Assets
Section 363 sales of assets occur outside a Chapter 11 reorganiza-
tion plan 74 and are consistent with hedge funds' overall strategy. "In
contrast to the negotiated plan where many disputes are resolved
through negotiation and distribution rather than litigation, a quick
Section 363 sale can leave unsecured creditors with nothing if the sale
proceeds are insufficient to pay even the secured debt in full."' 75 Thus,
unsecured creditors prefer negotiated plans that allow them some, al-
beit limited, recovery.
If a Section 1102 creditor committee cannot agree on an 'SPM
carve-out' of the proceeds from the asset sales, unsecured creditors
have few viable options.76 An SPM carve-out allows an undersecured
senior creditor and unsecured creditor committees to negotiate struc-
tured arrangements that bypass junior creditors. 77 The carve-out al-
lows the senior creditor to quickly reach a realization event by rallying
the support of unsecured creditors in return for the latter's limited
recovery. 78 Hedge funds, however, have one advantage over most un-
secured creditors: readily available capital. This allows hedge funds to
finance Section 363 asset sales, supply debtor-in-possession funding,
or acquire reorganization equity.79 All three options support "loan to
own," a strategy in which hedge funds attempt to quickly buy low and
sell high.80
Courts have recognized that Section 363 asset sales can be benefi-
cial to all parties, but hedge funds may pursue these sales even at the
expense of other creditors' interests.8 1 As a result, courts view such
sales as exceptional and only grant them when they are supported by
an identifiable business judgment.8 2
In the case In re Lionel Corp., the Second Circuit articulated seven
factors for courts to consider when deciding whether to approve a Sec-
tion 363 sale.8 3 The factors include:
74. Miller & Waisman, supra note 53.
75. Berman & Brighton, supra note 2, at 30.
76. Id.
77. Richard E. Mikels & Adrienne K. Walker, In re Iridium Operating LLC and Its Impact on
SPM Carve-Out Arrangements, 26-JAN Am. BANKR. INST. J. 38, 70 (2008).
78. Id.
79. Berman & Brighton, supra note 2, at 31 (internal quotations omitted).
80. Id. For a more detailed example of loan to own, see the In re Radnor Holdings Corp. case.
(In re Radnor Holdings Corp., 353 B.R. 820 (Bankr. D. Del. 2006)).
81. Miller & Waisman, supra note 53.
82. Id.
83. Miller & Waisman, supra note 53 (discussing In re Lionel Corp., 722 F.2d 1063 (2d Cir.
1983)).
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(i) the proportionate value of the assets to the whole estate, (ii) the
elapsed time since filing, (iii) the likelihood that a plan will be pro-
posed and confirmed in the near future, (iv) the effect of the pro-
posed disposition on future reorganizations, (v) the proceeds to be
obtained vis-A-vis any appraisals, (vi) which alternative (use, sale, or
lease) is being contemplated, and (vii) whether the asset is increas-
ing or decreasing in value. 84
These factors are not exclusive; however, for approval a sale must ulti-
mately aid the debtor's reorganization.85
Hedge funds that pursue Section 363 sales often look to sell out
their position, and "[q]uick sales or ill-conceived reorganizations are
often the best way to achieve the objectives of such financial specula-
tors."186 Such strategies clearly conflict with the rehabilitationist view
of Chapter 11, which holds that bankruptcy should balance the com-
peting interests of all parties involved.8 7 As a result, hedge funds can
expect to incur substantial resistance to Section 363 sale proposals.
2. Ad Hoc Committees
Bankruptcy Code Section 1102(a) states that unless the debtor is a
small business and a party requests otherwise, "the United States trus-
tee shall appoint a committee of creditors holding unsecured claims
and may appoint additional committees of creditors or of equity se-
curity holders as the United States trustee deems appropriate."'88 Sec-
tion 1102(a) "provides for the appointment of creditors' and equity
security holders' committees, which will be the primary negotiating
bodies for the formulation of the plan of reorganization."89 Hedge
funds with large unsecured debts against a debtor are eligible to serve
on creditors' committees at the discretion of the U.S. Trustee.90
The problem with hedge funds serving on creditors' committees is
that they usually purchase debt at a discount, which creates tension
and conflicts with other unsecured creditors who directly loaned capi-
tal to the debtor at fair market value.91 In addition, serving on a credi-
84. Id. (citing In re Lionel Corp., 722 F.2d at 1070-71).
85. Id. (citing In re Lionel Corp., 722 F.2d at 1070-71).
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(3) (2006); 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1). "[A] small business is defined as
one whose aggregate noncontingent liquidates secured and unsecured debts are less than [$2
million] as of the date of bankruptcy filing." H.R. REP. No. 103-834, at 30 (1994); 140 CONG.
REC. H10768 (1994).
89. H.R. REP. No. 595, at 401 (1977) (emphasis added).
90. See Fisher & Buck, supra note 1, at 86 (discussing "a hypothetical example to illustrate
some of the ways in which bankruptcy practice will need to adapt to the increasingly prominent
rule of hedge funds in bankruptcy proceedings").
91. Id.
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tors' committee restricts a fund's ability to trade debtors' securities. 92
The presence of inter-creditor conflicts and trade restrictions can force
hedge funds to seek alternative control over corporate reorganization.
Pursuant to Section 1102, hedge funds may also form ad hoc com-
mittees with other like-minded investors.93 A strong ad hoc committee
lacks statutory authority but may create enough of an advantage
within a bankruptcy case to block certain classes of claims.94 Unfortu-
nately, multiple ad hoc committees, which are often present in com-
plex litigation, tend to increase adversarial proceedings and extend
the bankruptcy process.95
3. Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 2019
A hedge fund's involvement in an ad hoc committee raises disclo-
sure issues, which hedge funds generally try to avoid. Historically,
hedge funds have been able to escape government regulation. Thus,
their involvement in bankruptcy proceedings may subject them to the
type of disclosure that they traditionally try to avoid. Whether Federal
Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 2019 requires ad hoc committees to
disclose both the committee financial information and its members'
information is a critical question because hedge funds generally prefer
to operate under a veil of secrecy.
When ad hoc groups form, and the members and debtor coordinate
their shared interests prior to the bankruptcy filing, there is a ten-
dency for non-member parties (i.e., other creditors or the court) to
demand disclosure of the group and committee members' financial in-
formation. 96 Most hedge funds will resist calls for financial disclosure,
but if the debtor moves forward into Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceed-
ings the bankruptcy court may force disclosure.
Bankruptcy courts have tools available for supervising hedge funds
in their proceedings. These tools include disclosure under Rule 2019
and equitable remedies such as vote designation or subordination of
claims. 97 Rule 2019 requires ad hoc committees to:
92. See id. (noting that committee creditors receive nonpublic information on the debtor,
which places them in a fiduciary function).
93. Id.
94. See id.
95. Fisher & Buck, supra note 1, at 86.
96. Evan D. Flaschen & Kurt A. Mayr, Ad Hoc Committees and the Misuse of Bankruptcy
Rule 2019, 16 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 6, Art. 3 (2007).
97. Fisher & Buck, supra note 1, at 88 (citing In re CF Holding Corp., 145 B.R. 124 (Bankr. D.
Conn. 1992) (disclosure); 11 U.S.C. § 510(c) (2008) and In re Mobile Steel Corp., 563 F.2d 692
(5th Cir. 1977) (subordination); 11 U.S.C. § 1126(e) (2008) and In re Maclead Co., 63 B.R. 654
(Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1986) (vote designation).
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[F]ile a verified statement setting forth (1) the name and address of
the creditor or equity security holder; (2) the nature and amount of
the claim or interest and the time of acquisition thereof unless it is
alleged to have been acquired more than one year prior to the filing
of the petition; (3) a recital of the pertinent facts and circumstances
in connection with the employment of the ... [ad hoc] committee,
the name or names of the entity or entities at whose instance, di-
rectly or indirectly, the employment was arranged or the committee
was organized or agreed to act; and (4) with reference to the time of
the... organization or formation of the committee.... the amounts
of claims or interests owned by the ... members of the committee
... the times when acquired, the amounts paid therefore, and any
sales or other disposition thereof.98
In addition to these requirements, ad hoc committees also must pro-
vide the court with a copy of the instrument granting them the author-
ity to act on behalf of the committee members and show any material
changes to the verified statement. 99 Failure to follow Rule 2019 may
result in a court's refusal to further hear the ad hoc committee or even
a dismissal of all previous actions and statements by the committee. 100
Some Bankruptcy courts have made it clear that ad hoc committees,
including their members, are required to make extensive public disclo-
sure.10 1 Traditionally, "counsel to ad hoc committees [would] file a dis-
closure identifying the members of the committee and their aggregate
(but not individual) holdings."'01 2 More recently, in In re Northwest
Airlines Corp., the Southern District of New York Bankruptcy Court
mandated that ad hoc committee members must provide "extensive
Rule 2019 public disclosure regarding their claims [or] interests, in-
cluding their complete trading histories in the debtor's securities.' ' 103
This represents a major shift in the continuing-disclosure rule because
it "requires each member of an ad hoc committee to [continually] dis-
close its specific holdings as well as the timing and amount paid to
acquire such holdings.' 0 4 The shift has not been accepted by all
courts and whether this trend will continue is yet to be seen.
Critics of the In re Northwest Airlines Corp. decision argue that
Rule 2019 applies to protective committees acting "in a representative
98. FED. R. BANKR. P. 2019(a).
99. Id.
100. FED. R. BANKR. P. 2019(b).
101. Flaschen & Mayr, supra note 96.
102. Id.
103. Flaschen & Mayr, supra note 96 (discussing In re Northwest Airlines Corp., 363 B.R. 701
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007)). However, in Scotia Development, the Bankruptcy Court for the South-
ern District of Texas rejected a motion to compel ad hoc committees to comply with Rule
2019(a). Id. (discussing In re Scotia Dev. LLC, 375 B.R. 764 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2007)).
104. Id.
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and fiduciary capacity. ' 10 5 The rule, however, does not distinguish be-
tween committees with a fiduciary relationship and those without one.
Even Chapter X, Section 210, and Rule 10-211 (which is nearly the
same as Bankruptcy Rule 2019) do not distinguish between a fiduciary
and non-fiduciary committee. 10 6 Contrary to the text of Rule 2019,
counsel to ad hoc committees generally voluntarily file Rule 2019
statements identifying group members so other litigants can be confi-
dent in the group's size and composition. 10 7 Ultimately, neither the
text nor traditional practice clarifies whether Rule 2019 applies to all
ad hoc committees.
Arguing Rule 2019 does not apply to ad hoc committees is difficult
because committees have traditionally satisfied some of the require-
ments of the rule. Case law suggests there are two plausible arguments
against the application of the rule to ad hoc committees. First, the rule
does not apply and committees have been voluntarily submitting to
partial Rule 2019 disclosures. Second, the rule does apply and the par-
tial disclosures do not satisfy the 2019 requirements. But in either case
the success of the argument lies in whether a committee can convince
a bankruptcy court that Rule 2019 does not apply in the first place.
To date, proposed arguments regarding the inapplicability of Rule
2019 to ad hoc committees have failed. One failed argument is Rule
2019 does not apply to ad hoc committees because fiduciary responsi-
bility is a fundamental component of Rule 2019.108 But in ad hoc com-
mittees there is no fiduciary relationship. The language of Rule 2019,
however, pertains to not only fiduciary committees but to all entities
that represent more than one creditor.10 9 The rule does not define the
capacity in which the entity or committee must act in order for the
requirements to apply. As a result, the argument that Rule 2019 re-
quires a fiduciary duty element is incorrect.
Another failed argument against the application of Rule 2019 to ad
hoc committees is the debtor has no legitimate use for the informa-
tion.110 This argument fails to recognize the systemic purposes of Rule
2019, which facilitates cooperation between the debtor and creditors
by helping the debtor recognize which creditors have a good faith in-
terest in reorganization. Further, the rule allows courts to monitor ad
hoc committee action by examining the members' interests. This is
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Flaschen & Mayr, supra note 96 (internal quotations omitted).
109. FED. R. BANKR. P. 2019(a); Compare with Flaschen & Mayr, supra note 96 (failing to
note that the rule's language applies to more than "committees").
110. Id.
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particularly important when a bankruptcy judge is weighing argu-
ments from various parties. In addition, some bankruptcy players are
likely to be familiar with hedge funds, but the rule levels the playing
field for all participants. Most hedge funds are relatively new, and
their participation in bankruptcy proceedings has been brief. Thus, ad
hoc committees have been unable to present a plausible argument as
to why Rule 2019 does not apply to ad hoc committees.
As a result, hedge fund impact on bankruptcy is still unknown, but
the fight over Rule 2019 is important because it may open the door to
hedge fund disclosure, at least to a limited degree. The outcome of
this issue and its impact on both hedge funds and their involvement in
bankruptcy proceedings are unclear. In all likelihood, a split among
the circuit courts will force the Supreme Court to address the issue.
D. Second-Lien Loans
Hedge funds are also heavily involved in the second-lien market,
which impacts bankruptcy proceedings in a number of ways. Second-
lien issues tend to increase the length of Chapter 11 reorganizations
and the number of adversaries involved in the proceeding. Although
second-lien loans can be a source of needed capital for a distressed
debtor, the increase in time and conflicts resulting from such transac-
tions can harm both debtors and hedge funds. Prolonging a liquidity
event is generally contrary to a fund's interest because there is a
greater possibility of the fund's assets devaluing. For the debtor, in-
creased adversaries redirect resources to litigation, not reorganization.
The creation and rapid expansion of the second-lien loan and sub-
prime lending markets has created novel bankruptcy issues. The in-
creasing rate of insolvency among hedge funds and their investments
has propelled issues between first- and second-lien holders to the fore-
front of bankruptcy proceedings.'11 In fact, "[o]ne cannot discuss the
explosion of hedge fund investments in insolvency scenarios without
addressing the dramatic explosion of two forms of second-lien financ-
ing commonly marketed in the U.S: (i) second-lien term loans de-
signed for sale in the institutional loan market; and (ii) second-lien
high-yield offerings.' 1 12 Part of the problem with second-lien loans is
the lack of market consistency. 113 A pre-agreement analysis of each
111. See Futter & Wells, supra note 10, at 222 (noting that "the relationship between the first
and second lien holders ... has received the most attention ... and it is the conflict between
these two that has most bankruptcy experts intrigued").
112. Gilhuly, supra note 3, at 451.
113. Id. at 464.
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intercreditor transaction is important. 114 The complexities and uncer-
tainties of secured second-lien creditor involvement will inevitably
complicate Chapter 11 cases.115 The lack of consistency between inter-
creditor agreements and the relatively new position of second-lien
creditors will create heated disputes in bankruptcy courts." 6
Traditionally, first-lien lenders resisted sharing collateral with sec-
ond-lien lenders. 117 The current reality, however, is that first-lien lend-
ers need to accommodate second-lien lenders in order to navigate
through restructuring."18
Important issues for most first lien lenders include: (i) control of
enforcement actions during an agreed-upon standstill period; (ii)
ability to force asset sales free and clear of liens; (iii) agreement of
second lien holder not to challenge liens or to object to asset sales;
(iv) the ability to put DIP financing in place that primes the second
liens; (v) the ability to obtain adequate protection without the sec-
ond lien holders' objection; (vi) inability of second lien creditors to
obtain cash payments (e.g., by way of adequate protection) in a
bankruptcy case; and (vii) a broad waiver by the second lien hold-
ers' rights that would arise in bankruptcy from holding collateral,
with the preservation of rights they would have if they were
unsecured. 11 9
Second-lien lenders are willing to accommodate many of these issues
because of their protected priority and interests.120 "High priority is-
sues for most second lien lenders include: (i) the ability to assert rights
of an unsecured creditor; (ii) the ability to vote their claims in bank-
ruptcy; (iii) a limited duration of an enforcement standstill; and (iv)
'tag along' rights whenever the first lien creditors obtain new collat-
eral.' 12' Thus, any structured agreement will require first-lien credi-
tors to address the second-lien creditor's high priority issues.
In addition, debtors are generally supportive of second-lien lenders
because they can get a lower interest rate on much" needed financ-
114. Id. Although details on these agreements is beyond the scope of this article, some of the
controversial terms include: (1) waiver of the right to oppose adequate protection for first debt
lien; (2) waiver of the second lien creditors' right to seek adequate protection other than replace-
ment liens; (3) use of cash collateral; (4) DIP financing; (5) asset sales; (6) plan voting agree-
ments; (7) are there limits on future first and second lien debt; (8) are two sets of security
documents needed; (9) separate credit documents; and (10) amendment and consent rights. See
generally id. (discussing these issues in more detail).
115. Id.
116. Id. at 467.
117. Gilhuly, supra note 3, at 470.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 471.
120. Id.
121. Id.
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ing.122 Debtors must recognize, however, that although the availability
of financing will increase as a result of second-lien lenders, the
debtor's ability to access first-lien financing may be limited by the
terms of second-lien agreements.1 23 Therefore, the increase in financ-
ing has a price.
In sum, hedge fund involvement in the second-lien market will in-
crease the amount of confrontation with more traditional first-lien
creditors. Both categories of creditors need to be aware of their coun-
terpart's interests and demands. To reach a liquidity event quickly, a
hedge fund needs to work with first-lien creditors. Prolonged disputes
will diminish a fund's opportunity to profit. Ultimately, hedge funds
can obtain preferential status because second-lien-secured-creditor
status allows the rights to excess collateral value and adequate protec-
tion, "cash collateral leverage, credit bidding opportunities, and a sig-
nificant voice in the debtor's restructuring plan. '1 24
E. Loan-to-Own: Debt and Equity Investment
Hedge funds are often involved in loan-to-own arrangements with
distressed companies. The funds apply this strategy by acquiring loans
(debt investments) or by purchasing securities (equity investments)
from distressed companies. 125 "These two avenues allow hedge funds
to influence any restructuring that takes place, and to have potential
ownership interest in the companies after restructuring.' 1 26
The first avenue, debt investments, may occur both pre- and post-
petition. In a pre-petition debt investment, hedge funds can provide
needed capital during the restructuring process by offering "second-
lien financings, or consolidate ('roll-up') multiple secured loans into a
single-credit facility. ' 127 These loan agreements allow the hedge fund
to become the debtor-in-possession (DIP) lender.28 Pre-petition ac-
tivities may also include short/long transactions in debt or equity and
balance sheet arbitrage. 29 Regardless of the methods used, hedge
funds are ultimately looking to control a company's restructuring. 30
By providing DIP loans, hedge funds can acquire a super-priority
status, gain access to inside information, and even use their creditor
122. Gilhuly, supra note 3, at 471.
123. Id. at 472.
124. Id. at 455.
125. Id. at 454.
126. Id.
127. Gilhuly, supra note 3, at 454.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 455.
[Vol. 7:35
HEDGE FUNDS: A NEW DIMENSION
status to credit bid during asset sales. 131 Because DIP loans are in-
cluded in Chapter 11 plans, lending hedge funds can have a significant
impact on the creation and confirmation of a Chapter 11 restructuring
plan.132
Alternatively, equity investments give hedge funds similar advan-
tages to debt investment, but with higher risk and higher potential
rewards.133 Like debt investment, equity investments may occur pre-
or post-petition. 34 During either period, the value of the distressed
company's stock is significantly low. 135 Once a hedge fund becomes an
equity investor, it can push for the "appointment of equity committees
that will have an official voice in shaping the reorganization plan
.... "136 Also, similar to debt investment, the ultimate goal is to buy
low and sell high.137
Hedge funds implement their equity investment strategies by pro-
viding a secured loan in return for creditor status and an equity stake
in the debtor.138 The hedge fund's package will also include numerous
benefits, such as board membership. 139 Eventually, if the debtor is un-
able to implement a successful reorganization plan, the hedge fund
will attempt to convert its debt into ownership "and eliminate the
'out-of-money' creditors and equity classes."' 40 Essentially, the funds
will fast-track the debtor to profitability.
The displaced parties will often object on a number of grounds, such
as breach of a fiduciary duty, inaccurate value, availability of a better
transaction, equitable subordination, debt recharacterization, or a lack
of good faith.141 The displaced parties will attempt to convince a court
that an outcome, which balanced all parties' interests, existed. 142 But
despite the potential for inequitable conduct, the loan-to-own action
of a hedge fund can also benefit distressed debtors by rapidly re-
turning them to profitability. Loan-to-own transactions are compara-
ble to a Section 363 sale of assets because both transactions
131. Id.
132. Gilhuly, supra note 3, at 455.
133. Id. at 456.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 456-57.
137. Gilhuly, supra note 3, at 457.
138. Jonathan M. Landers, Reflections on Loan-to-Own Trends, 26-Ocr AM. BANKR. INST. J.
1, 1 (2007).
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 44.
142. Id. at 46.
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circumvent the bankruptcy process. 143 Loan-to-own agreements, how-
ever, may be prepackaged, which results in quicker, economical out-
comes than the Section 363 asset sales. 144 In other words, the debtor
does not need to start the bankruptcy process before utilizing a loan-
to-own transaction. Accordingly, absent unfair conduct, the loan-to-
own arrangement may lead the debtor to a stronger post-reorganiza-
tion position.
F. Equitable Subordination
In some instances, a hedge fund's conduct is inequitable, which
could result in substantial harm to the hedge fund's interest. Gener-
ally, "money loaned by corporate insiders is as green as money loaned
by non-insiders; absent inequitable conduct, an insider's claim to re-
cover a loan to a corporation ranks pari passu with claims of non-
insider lenders. ' 145 In fact, the codification of equitable subordination
in Section 510(c) of the Bankruptcy Code helps to ensure that "hedge
funds are able to acquire both debt and equity in a company's capital
structure without undue risk that debt claims will be subordinated. 1 146
Courts use equitable subordination to change creditors' priority of
payment1 47 when a creditor engages in inequitable conduct that in-
jures other creditors or gives the violating creditor an unfair advan-
tage. 148 Application of equitable subordination must be consistent
with the Bankruptcy Code since insider debt is beneficial to distressed
debtors because inside investors usually have a better understanding
of the debtor's business and a stronger interest in its success. 149
Bankruptcy Code Section 510(c) allows equitable subordination
"for purposes of distribution of all or part of an allowed claim to all or
part of another allowed claim or all or part of an allowed interest to
all or part of another allowed interest" or to permit a court to transfer
a subordinated lien to the estate.'50 Under Section 510(c) "[t]he
court's power is broader than the general doctrine of equitable subor-
dination and encompasses subordination on any equitable
143. Landers, supra note 138, at 46.
144. Id.
145. James M. Wilton & Stephen Moeller-Sally, Debt Recharacterization Under State Law, 62
Bus. LAW. 1257, 1258 (2007).
146. Id. at 1259.
147. In re Submicron Sys. Corp., 432 F.3d 448, 454 (3d Cir. 2004).
148. Citicorp Venture Capital, Ltd. v. Comm. of Creditors Holding Unsecured Claims, 160
F.3d 982, 986 (3d Cir. 1998) (citing U.S. v. Noland, 517 U.S. 535 (1996)).
149. Id.; see Peter A. Alces, Clearer Conceptions of Insider Preferences, 71 WAULO 1107,
1108 (1993) (defining an insider as someone in a close relationship with the debtor, which allows
them to manipulate or control the debtor).
150. 11 U.S.C. 510(c)(1).
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grounds.' 151 In addition, Congress has stated that "under existing case
law, a claim is generally subordinated only if [the] holder of such [a]
claim is guilty of inequitable conduct, or the claim itself is of a status
susceptible to subordination .... ",152 Thus, the standards for triggering
bankruptcy equitable subordination is lower than the general civil re-
quirements of equitable subordination.
1. The Enron Expansion
Equitable subordination should be a serious concern for hedge
funds that aggressively pursue their self-interest in a bankruptcy
proceeding.
A [f]und that has acted aggressively for its own agenda through a
"loan to own" strategy, captive management and board control, or
through the aggressive pursuit of a [1]iquidity [e]vent without regard
for the company's prospects for successful reorganization or the im-
pact on other creditors, particular in [a] situation where the [f]und
can be construed to be an "insider" or in a position of control, may
find itself subject to equitable subordination under Bankruptcy
Code section 510(c) .... 153
The aggressive pursuit of strategic goals may place hedge funds in a
losing position, making pre-petition restructuring agreements more
attractive.
Generally, equitable subordination applies to creditors that behave
inequitably and harm other creditors or benefit from the inequitable
conduct. 154 In the Enron case, however, the court held that "buyers of
bankruptcy claims are now subject to subordination not just for their
own conduct, but also for conduct of previous owners of the claims,
regardless of whether the conduct was connected to the claims."'1 55
This extension of equitable subordination to subsequent debt purchas-
ers is known as the "Enron expansion." Experts argue that this expan-
sion of equitable subordination will severely affect the bankruptcy-
claims-trading market, which could limit the liquidity available to dis-
tressed Chapter 11 debtors. 156
151. William L. Norton, Jr., Bankruptcy Code and Related Legislation, Legislative History, and
Editorial Commentary Case Annotations, 8 NORTON BANKR. L. & PRAC. 581 (2d ed. 2007) (cit-
ing H.R. REP. No. 595, (1977)).
152. Id. (citing 124 CONG. REC. H11095 (1978); S17412 (1978); (remarks of Rep. Edwards and
Sen. Deconcini)).
153. Futter & Wells, supra note 10, at 248 (footnote omitted).
154. Adam J. Levitin, The Limits of Enron: Counterparty Risk in Bankruptcy Claims Trading,
15 J. BANKR. L. & PRAc. 4, Art. 3 (2006).
155. Id. (discussing In re Enron Corp. 333 B.R. 205, 210 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005)).
156. Id.
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In the Enron case, the court's "Enron expansion" had a direct im-
pact on five hedge funds that had purchased claims valued at over $47
million.15 7 An adversary proceeding known as the "Megacomplaint"
alleged that the seller of the claims had acted inequitably and de-
manded subordination of the claims.15 8 Although the funds did not
appear to have any knowledge of the seller's actions, the bankruptcy
court held: (1) equitable subordination applies to conduct unrelated to
the claim; (2) the subordination could apply to a transferee; and (3)
the transferee could not argue a good faith purchaser defense.'5 9
The three-pronged "Enron expansion" relied on questionable pre-
cedent and debatable policy conclusions, 160 and created a number of
potentially unfavorable effects on distressed debtors. First, the deci-
sion will likely shrink the bankruptcy-claims-trading market, which
will cause creditors to "be more reluctant to deal with distressed or
high-risk companies because of the possibility that they would be left
holding bankruptcy claims and forced to incur the expense and incon-
venience of being claim holders. ' 161 Second, the decrease in the sec-
ondary market liquidity will cause a liquidity tightening in the primary
market.' 62 Third, the tightening of the primary market will increase
the number of distressed debtors.' 63 The result is a spiraling crisis that
could affect the entire U.S. debt market.
Purchasers of bankruptcy claims will also find it very difficult to re-
act to the new market conditions.
Claims purchasers lack reliable information for calculating the sta-
tistical probability of subordination of a particular claim. They do
not have sufficient information about any particular upstream
claimholder's actions, and even if they did, they cannot calculate the
magnitude of damages caused by the inequitable behavior. And in
electronic [over-the-counter] markets, like bond trading, the trades
are typically anonymous, so it is impossible to learn about upstream
holders.' 64
Therefore, the lack of reliable market information regarding equitable
subordination will create uncertainty in the bankruptcy-claims-trading
market. Further, given the unpredictable nature of equitable subordi-
nation claims, it is difficult to calculate the value of a tainted claim. 65
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Levitin, supra note 154.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Levitin, supra note 154.
165. Id.
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Ultimately, the "Enron expansion" has increased the uncertainty
and impact of equitable subordination. The expansion may apply be-
yond the bankruptcy-claim-trading market. In fact, the expansion may
apply to pre-petition claim or debt purchases. 166 If the Enron ruling
gains strength, it could undermine the availability of liquidity for dis-
tressed debtors, shrinking the U.S. debt market.
2. The Third Circuit Perspective
The Third Circuit has a unique perspective on equitable subordina-
tion which hedge funds should be aware of and plan accordingly. First,
the Third Circuit has held that creditor misconduct is not a necessary
element of equitable subordination, and the equitable subordination
remedy is unavailable when inequitable conduct did not cause
harm.167 As a result, offending parties can retain their profits if their
inequitable conduct does not harm outside creditors. Second, the
court has held quantifiable facts must support any remedy beyond dis-
gorgement of profits.168 In sum, the Third Circuit's perspective focuses
on the ultimate injury to non-benefiting parties, and without such
quantified injury the doctrine does not apply.1 69
G. Debt Recharacterization
Debt recharacterization "is a court's attempt to discern whether the
parties called an instrument one thing when in fact they intended it as
something else. 170 Debt recharacterization is another important issue
for hedge funds because it can affect the transaction that ultimately
brings the hedge fund into the bankruptcy proceeding. In a bank-
ruptcy proceeding, a debt investment has a higher priority than a capi-
tal investment.17' Debt investments are purchases of a debtor's
unsecured debts, while capital investments are purchases of the
debtor's equity.172 Capital investments create some type of ownership
interest in a debtor, such as equity holdings. If a hedge fund wants to
maintain a higher priority in a bankruptcy proceeding, it must clearly
establish that its investment is debt by showing that it purchased a
debtor's secured or unsecured claims as opposed to purchasing equity,
166. Id.
167. In re Submicron Sys. Corp., 432 F.3d 448, 462 (3d Cir. 2004).
168. Citicorp Venture Capital, Ltd. v. Comm. of Creditors Holding Unsecured Claims, 160
F.3d 982, 991 (3d Cir. 1998).
169. Id. at 991-92.
170. In re Submicron Sys. Corp., 432 F.3d 448, 456 (3d Cir. 2004).
171. See Robert J. Rosenberg & Michael J. Riela, Hedge Funds: The New Masters of the
Bankruptcy Universe, 17 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 5 ART. 7 (2008).
172. See id.
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i.e., an ownership position, in the debtor. If it does not, a fund risks
having its "debt" recharacterized as a capital investment, which will
lower the fund's priority and status.
In addition, insider loans create debt recharacterization issues be-
cause the insider has a strong interest in the longevity of the distressed
debtor, which makes insider-loan transactions look like a capital in-
vestment. In other words, an insider's interest in the distressed debtor
is more consistent with an equity holder than a creditor. Thus, debt
recharacterization is a substantial threat to insider loans because it has
the potential to subordinate insider investments. 173 As a result, dis-
tressed debtors may suffer from lack of investments from insiders who
have a better understanding of the debtor's business.
Ultimately, debt recharacterization prevents equity holders from
characterizing their holdings as debt, and therefore obtaining a higher
priority. The dichotomy of debt and equity establishes that equity
holders receive their benefits if the corporate entity is successful while
creditors receive protection if the entity fails. Allowing an equity
holder to reap both the benefits of success and protection of failure is
inconsistent with the bankruptcy process and unfair to other creditors.
Thus, debt recharacterization operates to keep debt and capital invest-
ments separate, which establishes predictability in transactions with
the corporate entity.
1. The Majority View: The Third, Fourth,
Fifth, Sixth, and Tenth Circuits
Some courts consider the parties' intent at the time of the transac-
tion determinative of a debt's character. 174 The majority of federal cir-
cuit courts apply varying tests to determine whether to recharacterize
a debt. For example, the Sixth Circuit uses an eleven-factor test to
determine whether an investment was debtor equity in the
recharacterization context. 75 The factors examined include:
(1) the name given to the instruments, if any, evidencing the indebt-
edness; (2) the presence or absence of a fixed maturity date and
schedule of payments; (3) the presence or absence of a fixed rate of
interest and interest payments; (4) the source of repayments; (5) the
adequacy or inadequacy of capitalization; (6) the identity of interest
between the creditor and the stock holders; (7) the security, if any,
for the advances; (8) the corporation's ability to obtain financing
from outside lending institutions; (9) the extent to which the ad-
173. Wilton & Moeller-Sally, supra note 145, at 1259.
174. In re Submicron Sys. Corp., 432 F.3d 448, 457 (3d Cir. 2004).
175. Id. at n.8 (citing Roth Steel Tube Co. v. Comm'r, 800 F.2d 625 (6th Cir. 1986) and In re
AutoStyle Plastics, Inc., 269 F.3d 726, 749-50 (6th Cir. 2001)).
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vances were subordinated to the claims of outside creditors; (10) the
extent to which the advances were used to acquire capital assets;
and (11) the presence or absence of a sinking fund to provide
repayments.1 76
Thus, the Sixth Circuit looks at a number of factors in determining
whether an investment is debt or equity.
The Fifth Circuit uses a similar multi-factor test, but adds the fol-
lowing factors: (1) the enforceability of principal and interest pay-
ments; (2) the relation of the investment to other creditor
investments; (3) the amount of capitalization; and (4) the debtor's re-
payment of the loan. 177 In addition, the Third Circuit has recognized
and applies the factors from both tests.178
In order to facilitate this priority scheme, bankruptcy courts must
have the authority to determine the classification and order of
claims. 179 The Fourth Circuit distinguished equitable subordination
from debt recharacterization based on the separate purposes in-
volved. 180 Specifically, the court stated that "a bankruptcy court's
recharacterization decision rests on the substance of the transaction
giving rise to the claimant's demand, its equitable subordination deci-
sion rests on its assessment of the creditor's behavior." 181 Debt re-
ceives a higher priority than equity. 182 The court also recognized that
debt maintains its classification despite the application of equitable
subordination. 8 3 Finally, the court noted its decision was consistent
with "every other circuit that has considered the question."'1 84 To date,
the Third, Fourth, Sixth and Tenth Circuits have similarly and consist-
ently applied debt recharacterization. 1s5
In fact, "[d]uring the past twenty years, debt recharacterization has
displaced equitable subordination as a favored cause of action for
bankruptcy trustees and creditors' committees seeking to invalidate
176. Id.
177. Id. (citing Estate of Mixon v. U.S., 464 F.2d 394, 402 (5th Cir. 1972)).
178. In re Submicron Sys. Corp., 432 F.3d 448, 456 (3d Cir. 2004).
179. In re Official Comm. of Unsecured for Dornier Aviation (North America), Inc., 453 F.3d
225, 231 (4th Cir. 2006).
180. Id. at 232.
181. Id. (internal emphasis omitted).
182. Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. § 726 (2000)).
183. Id. (citing In re Hedged-Invs. Assocs., Inc., 380 F.3d 1292, 1297 (10th Cir. 2004)).
184. In re Dornier Aviation, 453 F.3d 225, 232 (4th Cir. 2006) (citing In re Submicron Sys.
Corp., 432 F.3d 448, 454 (3d Cir. 2004); Hedge-Invs., 380 F.3d at 1297; In re AutoStyle Plastics,
Inc., 269 F.3d 726, 747-48 (6th Cir. 2001)).
185. Id.
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loans or other debt claims held by insiders in bankruptcy cases."'1 86
This is because it is "a 'no fault' cause of action that does not require
proof of equitable conduct be the insider/creditor."18 7 Thus, debt
recharacterizations should be a concern for hedge funds, particularly
when the fund has a pre-position equity position in the debtor.
2. The Minority View: The Eleventh Circuit
Unlike the majority of circuits, the Eleventh Circuit does not follow
a multi-factor test. Instead, the court embraced a two-prong test, 188
deeming a contribution capital when the trustee proves either: (1) the
debtor's initial undercapitalization; or (2) that other disinterested
lenders would not have extended credit under the circumstances. 189
The Eleventh Circuit's test does not follow state or federal precedent
and essentially limits insider loans to debtor-in-possession financ-
ing.190 However, this test remains a minority perspective, recognized
only in the Eleventh Circuit. 191
3. The Rejecter: The Ninth Circuit
Finally, the Ninth Circuit has rejected debt recharacterization
claims, holding that Section 510(c), which governs equitable subordi-
nation, precludes bankruptcy courts from recharacterizing debts
outside of Section 510(C). 1 9 2 In essence, the Ninth Circuit forbids debt
recharacterization as an attempt to avoid the express provisions of the
Bankruptcy Code.
The remaining circuits-First, Second, and Seventh Circuits-have
not clearly established a test for debt recharacterization. Regardless,
the broad acceptance of debt recharacterization requires that hedge
funds remain aware of how a circuit court will analyze the transaction
between the fund and the debtor. Clearly establishing the character of
the investment, as either debt or capital, is important once the bank-
ruptcy proceeding begins or when the transaction comes under scru-
tiny. Ignoring debt recharacterization could substantially influence the
fund's preferred investment in the debtor and the overall goals and
strategy of the fund.
186. Wilton & Moeller-Sally, supra note 145, at 1257. The cited article does a nice job of
discussing the history and development of debt recharacterization, which is beyond the scope of
this article.
187. Id. at 1259.
188. Id. at 1260.
189. Id. (quoting In re N & D Props., Inc., 799 F.2d 726, 733 (11th Cir. 1986)).
190. Id. at 1260-61.
191. Wilton & Moeller-Sally, supra note 145, at 1261.
192. Id. at 1267 (discussing In re Pac. Express, Inc., 69 B.R. 112, 115 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1986)).
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IV. CONCLUSION
The presence of hedge funds in Chapter 11 cases marks a cultural
shift in bankruptcy practice, as some hedge fund strategies create con-
flicts with the Code's traditional emphasis on the rehabilitation of
debtors.1 93 Large amounts of capital, a preference for high-risk and
high-rewards, and aggressive investment strategies make hedge funds
a formidable force in bankruptcy. 194 As hedge fund involvement in
Chapter 11 cases continues to grow, some of the discussed issues may
resolve themselves, particularly if the market becomes more consis-
tent or transparency increases. In the meantime, practitioners need to
be prepared to handle the complexity and uniqueness of Chapter 11
proceedings involving hedge fund creditors.
Hedge fund involvement in bankruptcy can be very beneficial as
funds are willing to bear more risk than traditional lenders and are
able to provide necessary capital. 95 In addition, hedge fund investing,
particularly through second-lien loans, may actually eliminate the
need for Chapter 11 bankruptcy relief.' 96 Further, DIP post-petition
financing can sustain a distressed company throughout the reorganiza-
tion process.1 97 Finally, hedge funds create flexibility in the market,
allowing high-risk creditors to remain involved and freeing low-risk
creditors to pursue other investments. 98
The disadvantages of hedge fund involvement in bankruptcy in-
clude increased complexity, expenses, and lengthy proceedings.199
Like every other bankruptcy player, hedge funds are likely to aggres-
sively pursue their interests. Unlike some players, however, the ad-
vantages that hedge funds can obtain also create additional burdens.
For example, hedge funds often seek to establish an ad hoc committee
to promote their interests, "adding costs and administrative burdens
to an already struggling debtor's business. '200 The committees will
provide the funds with inside information and greater control over the
restructuring process.201 In addition to committee control, hedge
funds-with their immense capital-can acquire control over an en-
tire class of creditors,20 2 which allows the fund to pressure the debtor
193. Fisher & Buck, supra note 1, at 88.
194. Gilhuly, supra note 3, at 506.
195. Id. at 458.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Gilhuly, supra note 3, at 458.
200. Id. at 458-59.
201. Id. at 459.
202. Id.
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into a specific restructuring plan that may be good for the fund but of
questionable benefit to the company. 203
Hedge funds' interests often conflict with other traditional creditors
and even the debtor. Hedge fund strategies tend to be more aggres-
sive and focused on the short-term. They are also not necessarily con-
cerned with the future of the debtor, which means their presence
creates uncertainty and increases tension in a bankruptcy proceeding;
further, the secrecy surrounding hedge funds compound these issues.
Finally, in Chapter 11 proceedings where a powerful hedge fund is
involved, the fund's strategies, which aggressively seek to protect its
own interests, will complicate the proceedings and make them more
expensive and less likely to reach a consensus among the various cred-
itors and the debtor.204 A hedge fund may vigorously challenge senior
debt holders as it seeks to shore up its relatively weak position or
achieve its strategic goals,205 and the creation of ad hoc committees
and the debtor's resistance to hedge fund strategies will likely fuel
conflicts.206
In sum, hedge funds-like every other player in a bankruptcy pro-
ceeding-bring their own issues and interests to the table, and bank-
ruptcy practitioners need to be prepared to adapt to the changing
landscape. 20 7
203. Id.
204. Futter & Wells, supra note 10, at 246-47.
205. See id. at 247 (noting that "[t]here has already been, and most likely will continue to be,
extensive litigation between the holders of the senior debt, and the funds holding second lien
debt over the enforceability and validity in chapter 11 of their inter-creditor agreements").
206. Id. "The debtor wants to pursue a plan that will entail wiping out the current equity and
giving equity in the reorganized debtor to existing creditors." Id.
207. Fisher & Buck, supra note 1, at 88.
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